The Kargil crisis led to a major and much needed review of India’s higher defence management and security architecture including intelligence reforms. The Kargil Review Committee was headed by the eminent Defence analyst K Subhramanyam, and subsequently the KRC’s report was vetted by the high powered Group of Ministers. The Government also appointed four task forces to go into various recommendations of the KRC. The task force on Intelligence was headed by ex R&AW Chief Mr Gary Saxena which made significant recommendations.

According to one estimate, over 100 countries currently conduct intelligence operations against the United States. Adversary intelligence organizations place a high priority on the acquisition of scientific and technical information and target the United States because of its preeminence in many high-technology areas. The United States Government, American corporations, and U.S. universities have been targeted by intelligence organizations seeking scientific and technical intelligence.

Using information gathered from a simple job posting, along with ideas we presented earlier in the chapter, we will demonstrate how we were able to track down a target employee. Our first step was to search a job posting site looking for hiring managers. After searching for a hiring manager from the target organization, we acquired the email address shown in Figure 1-14. Social applications attempt to prevent unauthorized parties from viewing users’ information.

When he died in 1969, President Nixon remarked, “” . . . in the nature of his task, his achievements were known to only a few.”” A .gov website belongs to an official government organization in the United States. Once we obtained the email address, we used Google to track down information on the hiring manager, as illustrated in Figure 1-15. The information we obtained identified the hiring manager’s name and work phone number. Once the attacker has obtained and submitted this information, he is presented with Figure 1-8. The additional “private” information being requested in this example is the target’s college graduation year.

A touchgraph will assist in mapping out the possible interactions between people in the organization, and how to access them from the outside . The amount of time for the total test will directly impact the amount of Intelligence gathering that can be done. In these engagements a testing company would spend a tremendous amount of time looking into each of the core business units and personal of the company. However, for shorter crystal-box style tests the objectives may be far more tactical.

One meter imagery is sufficient to conduct technical analysis of terrain, determine key facilities in an urban area, and conduct detailed analyses of industrial facilities. Other nations such as France, Germany, Japan, and Canada are producing advanced imagery platforms that could be used to target sensitive facilities. Existing imagery systems and developmental commercial systems will be discussed in greater detail in Section 5. An additional factor that must be considered is the growing availability of sophisticated imagery work stations, and analytical tools. These capabilities will allow adversaries to conduct in-depth analysis for targeting and technical intelligence gathering.

Intrusive on-site inspection activities required under some arms control agreements provide a significant opportunity for HUMINT collection at facilities of great importance to the national security of the United States. In addition, the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty , the Threshold Test Ban Treaty , and the Open Skies Treaty provide the opportunity to gather information from sensitive installations, even though no intrusive on-site inspections are permitted. These treaties provide for the use of technical collection capabilities to verify national declarations. The operation of these collection systems requires a significant number of support personnel, and some of these personnel are likely to be intelligence collectors. Intelligence collectors in onsite inspections will be accredited inspectors who are specially trained to collect specific types of data and enjoy diplomatic immunity. It is likely that these personnel will try to obtain intelligence through observation of facilities, elicitation of information from escorts and facility personnel, and collection of available documentation.

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